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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 This article examines several consequences of the events that we commemorate 
each Constitution Day. “We the People of the United States” govern ourselves under 
a document framed by a specific group of politicians in a specific place at a specific 
time—the Federal Convention in Philadelphia, from May to September 1787. The 
document was signed on September 17, 1787, a date we have come to call Constitution 
Day.1 We have extensive documentation of what went on in the Convention; as a 
result, we think we have sound, reliable guidance from the Constitution’s architects 
about how to interpret it properly. In light of that belief, and of the recognized need 
for some restraint on constitutional interpretation to prevent “freewheeling judges” 
from reading into the Constitution’s text whatever they want to find there, many 
legal scholars find comfort in our new constitutional orthodoxy: the jurisprudence of 
originalism.2
 Long ago, I lost my faith in that orthodoxy—and the reasons that I lost my faith 
are rooted in my professional identity as a historian masquerading as a law professor. 
Historians who study the Founding Period regularly wrestle with problems of 
evidence and with problems of historical, political, and intellectual context that most 
legal scholars do not bother to consider. By contrast, especially after the recent gun-
rights decisions handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court,3 we have heard various 
proclamations, based on the use of originalist methods in both the majority and the 
minority opinions in those cases, that “we are all originalists now.”4 I reject that 
claim, and I hope to show you why.
1. For a discussion of the Constitution’s origins in the Federal Convention of 1787, see generally Richard 
R. Beeman, Plain, Honest Men: The Making of the Constitution (2009); Carol Berkin, A 
Brilliant Solution: Inventing the American Constitution (2002); Max Farrand, The 
Framing of the Constitution (1913); Clinton Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention (W.W. 
Norton & Co. 1987) (1966). For two studies expanding the interpretative context beyond the actual 
events of the Convention, see Richard B. Bernstein with Kym S. Rice, Are We to Be a Nation?: 
The Making of the Constitution (1987) and Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics 
and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (1996).
2. The literature on this topic is immense. For a summary sketch of originalism, its history, and the issues 
it raises, see R.B. Bernstein, The Founding Fathers Reconsidered 143–67 (2009). See also Alan 
Gibson, Interpreting the Founding: Guide to the Enduring Debates over the Origins and 
Founding of the American Republic (2d ed. 2010); Alan Gibson, Understanding the 
Founding: The Crucial Questions (2d ed. 2010); Dennis J. Goldford, The American 
Constitution and the Debate Over Originalism (2005); Interpreting the Constitution: 
The Debate Over Original Intent (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990); Johnathan O’Neill, Originalism 
in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional History (2005); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., 
Originalism, Federalism, and the American Constitutional Enterprise: A Historical 
Inquiry (2007).
3. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(2008).
4. Dave Kopel, Conservative Activists Key to DC Handgun Decision, Hum. Events, June 27, 2008, http://
www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=27229 (“At least in terms of the Second Amendment, we are all 
originalists now.”).
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 In Part II, I address the contextual frameworks, both intellectual and 
technological, that shape our interpretations of the Constitution. In Part III, I discuss 
the “Absent Founders,” individuals who are relevant to the Constitution’s origins but 
are often overlooked in the search for original intent. In Part IV, I explore the 
consequences for originalism of rapid constitutional change during the Revolutionary 
Era. In Part V, I explain how the case of the exploding cigar, or examples of problems 
in how the Constitution operated, caused the Founders’ expectations, understandings, 
and intentions to blow up in their faces. Finally, in Part VI, I offer some tentative 
conclusions about the consequences of these historian’s heresies for the enterprise of 
constitutional interpretation.
 First, I offer a quick explanation of what is going on in this controversy. In the 
Constitution, we have a text—4000 words framed by the delegates to the Federal 
Convention between May and September of 1787, and 4000 words of amendments 
added to the document between 1791 and 1992. In some cases, the Constitution’s text 
disposes of an issue—for example, a thirty-year-old cannot run for President because 
Article II of the Constitution sets the minimum age for President at thirty-five.5 But 
when we turn to other issues for which we can read words of the Constitution (and the 
Bill of Rights) to have a range of meanings, then we have a problem. Some examples of 
these issues are:
•	 	What	does	 it	mean	to	“declare	War”?6 What are the powers of 
the President as commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the 
United States? Can the President commit us to war without 
Congress declaring war?7
•	 	What	 is	 an	 impeachable	 offense?	 In	 particular,	we	 know	what	
treason and bribery are, but what are “high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors”?8 Did President Bill Clinton’s conduct with 
Monica Lewinsky amount to “high crimes and misdemeanors” 
warranting his impeachment?9
5. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
6. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
7. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its 
Aftermath (1993) (discussing the Vietnam War and the role of the President and Congress in 
declaring war); Francis D. Wormuth & Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War: The 
War Power of Congress in History and Law (2d ed. 1989) (discussing the Vietnam War and 
instances of Presidents committing “acts of war” without congressional authorization).
8. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4.
9. See generally Emily Field Van Tassel & Paul Finkelman, Impeachable Offenses: A Documentary 
History from 1787 to the Present 268–74 (1999) (discussing the Clinton-Lewinksy scandal and its 
effect on the impeachment proceedings against President Clinton).
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•	 	What	 is	 “Commerce	 .	 .	 .	 among	 the	 several	States”?10 How far 
does congressional power over interstate commerce extend?11
 It is in such cases, with words rich in competing meanings, that we must come 
up with a sound way of interpreting the Constitution. Sometimes the text’s plain 
meaning does not get us anywhere. At such times, we wonder what a judge will do 
with the text of the Constitution. Can we leash the judge so that he or she does not 
run all over the place, making law—by which critics of judges mean “making up 
law”? We trust judges with some discretion, some leeway—but how much leeway is 
safe and how much discretion lets unelected judges rewrite our Constitution to mean 
whatever they want it to mean?
 In the past quarter-century, the answer we increasingly hear is that the best way 
to leash federal judges is to make them conform to the intentions, understandings, or 
meanings of the Founding Fathers as to what the Constitution meant at the time of 
its framing and adoption. The argument that originalists make is that history will 
anchor the judges, because history will give clear answers to these loaded questions, 
and the judges on the leash of history will never run wild again.12
 One central purpose of this article is to declare that this well-meant remedy is no 
remedy at all. Rather than leashing judges, it lets them run wild in different ways, 
producing both bad law and bad history, while assuring us that they are doing what 
they are doing only because the Founding Fathers intended, understood, or meant 
the Constitution to let them do what they are doing.
 Over the past few decades, we have seen an outpouring not only of originalist 
judicial opinions, from the Supreme Court on down, but also of originalist scholarship 
by law professors who take on the role of historian to assemble evidence for one or 
another reading of the Constitution based on originalist methods. This originalist 
scholarship or jurisprudence always sounds the same. It begins with a paragraph like 
this one (which I have made up out of whole cloth):
 The Framers of the Constitution first considered the question of combing 
the hair of Senators on June 10. Roger Sherman of Connecticut stated that he 
“did not see the necessity of it. Senators would be able to comb their own hair 
as they saw fit.” James Madison of Virginia observed that “the question of 
combing hair was one posing critical questions of differences among the several 
states, and it would be prudent not to prescribe a general rule that would give 
offense.” Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania added, “In the Roman Senate, 
the Senators combed their own hair, but it was not so in the councils of the 
Athenian League.” Against this emerging consensus, Charles Pinckney of 
South Carolina warned, “We should not be guided merely by questions of 
prudence, nor fear of controversy, nor the lessons of the past. We are Americans 
and we must devise an American answer to this problem, or Europe will laugh 
10. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Commerce Power Versus States Rights (1936); Felix 
Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and Waite (1937).
12. See Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 5, 9–11 
(1988).
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at us for continuing to imitate them.” At this point, Benjamin Franklin 
recommended that prayers be said in the Convention. As Madison later wrote, 
“His proposal was respected by many but supported by none.” General 
Washington put the question, and the delegates agreed unanimously to drop 
the clause about combing Senatorial hair from the committee report. Pinckney 
revived the question on July 6. At that time . . . .
I exaggerate only a little. Note how my imagined paragraph paraphrases our principal 
source for what the Federal Convention did, James Madison’s Notes of Debates in the 
Federal Convention of 1787,13 presenting disinterested Framers (with a capital “F”) as 
articulating abstract, well-considered views. Note how it ignores the Convention’s 
internal politics, the disagreements among various factions, and so forth. Such 
accounts, presenting the Convention as a quasi-academic meeting hermetically sealed 
in a timeless vacuum, treat the evidence of original intent, such as it is, as scripture 
requiring expounding rather than as historical evidence requiring interpretation and 
understanding.
 And let us not even begin to probe the problem of the Constitution’s status when 
the delegates signed it on September 17, 1787. It was only a proposal, and awaited the 
action of the people’s representatives in the thirteen state ratifying conventions that 
would meet from the fall of 1787 through the summer of 1788, with the last two, 
North Carolina and Rhode Island, catching up with their peers in November 1789 
and May 1790, respectively.14 Ratification generated a vast polemical literature for 
and against the proposed Constitution, which had to wait until 1976 for documentation 
in a definitive scholarly edition still underway,15 and had to wait until 2010 for a 
comprehensive history.16
 Many historians have examined the legion of evidentiary problems with originalist 
jurisprudence—a subject that, historians hope (with little reason for hope), will catch 
the attention of originalist judges and legal scholars.17 I focus instead on “historian’s 
heresies”—issues that illuminate the complicated relationship between history and 
constitutional interpretation.
 First, I want to address a threshold definitional question—sorting out what 
originalism means to those who call themselves originalists. There are three f lavors 
13. 1–4 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
14. See generally Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787–1788 
(2010); see also infra note 15.
15. 1–10 & 13–23 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution (John P. 
Kaminski et al. eds., 1976–2005). Twenty-one of a projected twenty-nine volumes have been published to 
date. For an excellent selected edition based on The Documentary History of the Ratification of the 
Constitution, see 1–2 The Debate on the Constitution (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
16. See, e.g., Maier, supra note 14.
17. For a valuable array of conflicting views, see, for example, Interpreting the Constitution: The 
Debate Over Original Intent, supra note 2; James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The 
Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1986), reprinted in Interpreting the 
Constitution: The Debate Over Original Intent, supra note 2, at 151.
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of originalism.18 Original intent means the specific opinion and hopes of those whom 
we usually call the Founding Fathers—but here I call them the “Founding Guys” to 
counter the clouds of incense usually accompanying references to the Founding 
Fathers—about what they wanted the Constitution or a given constitutional provision 
to do.19 Original understanding means what the Founding Guys would say if, while 
they had their heads under the hood of the Constitution, you asked them what they 
understood the work they were doing to be; they might not have specific intentions 
that answer your question, but they would come up with an answer for you about 
how they understood the Constitution or a given constitutional provision would 
work. Finally, original meaning denotes the answer you would receive if you were to 
go into the streets of Philadelphia, New York, Boston, or Charleston in 1787–1788 
with a copy of the Constitution in one hand and a reliable eighteenth-century 
dictionary in the other hand and ask a typical intelligent citizen what he thinks the 
Constitution or a given constitutional provision might mean. Justice Antonin Scalia, 
often cited as a leading originalist, puts himself in that last category, calling himself 
a “plain-meaning” interpreter of the Constitution, focusing on the plain meaning of 
the document as of the time of its framing and ratification.20 But he forgets that it is 
highly possible for different people to reach different conclusions about the same 
constitutional language and what it supposedly meant more than two centuries 
ago—as the Founding Guys themselves discovered more than once.
 This seeming digression brings me to my first historian’s heresy about the 
constitutional orthodoxy of originalism.
ii. thE CasE Of thE Missing COntEXtUaL fraMEWOrKs
 We know that the Founding was a long time ago, but we must look more closely 
at the significance of the gap separating past and present for the enterprise of 
interpreting the Constitution in the light of history. This question has two aspects: 
intellectual and technological.
 A. Intellectual Context
 We are all prisoners of the intellectual world in which we were born, raised, 
educated, and trained. We see the world through our era’s conceptual lenses. Our 
assumptions, values, concerns, and crises inevitably distort our perceptions of the 
past, and we must adjust for those biases. When examining the Constitution’s origins, 
18. See Rakove, supra note 1, at 7–8.
19. For a discussion of the origins and meanings of the term “Founding Fathers,” see Bernstein, supra note 
2, at 3–11. The phrase “Founding Guys” is the coinage of professor Joanne B. Freeman of Yale 
University.
20. See, e.g., Ralph A. Rossum, Antonin Scalia’s Jurisprudence: Text and Tradition passim (2006); 
see also A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) 
(providing an essay by Justice Scalia and various critical essays).
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we must make a painful effort to understand the intellectual world of the Founding 
Guys—to grasp their concerns, not ours.21
 They worried about the strengths and weaknesses of republican government—
and they were haunted by specters of luxury, corruption, and other threats to civic 
virtue, the constellation of ideas, attitudes, and behaviors that preserved republican 
government. They did not trust democracy (which they defined as direct democracy, 
like a New England town meeting). They were all too aware that most of the world’s 
nation-states were monarchies. They were engaged deeply with the classical world, 
seeing themselves as successors to the Greek democracies and Republican Rome.22 
Douglass Adair, one of the greatest scholars of this period, warned:
I . . . hold[] that the experience of each of us draws a circle of wider or 
narrower dimensions around each of us, and that our freedom of choice and 
options of necessity take place within this circle. . . . [T]he “area” of experience 
that I have been most fascinated in for our eighteenth century friends is the 
realm of symbolic experience—their reading, their formal college training, 
etc.—which I feel structured and determined to a significant degree the 
physical world they saw with their eyes, or didn’t see. . . . It is my own feeling 
that we really can’t break into the eighteenth century semi-closed circle that 
determined their meaning and expectations when they talked about the limits 
and possibilities of politics and social organization.23
Sadly, most originalist interpreters of the Constitution are unaware or heedless of 
Adair’s concerns.
21. See generally Douglass Adair, Fame and the Founding Fathers passim (Trevor Colbourn ed., Liberty 
Fund, Inc. 1998) (1974); Joyce Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical 
Imagination (1992); Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 
(enlarged ed. 1992); Bernstein, supra note 1, passim; Bernstein, supra note 2, at 12–114; Henry Steele 
Commager, The Empire of Reason: How Europe Imagined and America Realized the 
Enlightenment (1977) [hereinafter Commager, The Empire of Reason]; Henry Steele Commager, 
Jefferson, Nationalism, and the Enlightenment (1975); Robert A. Ferguson, The American 
Enlightenment, 1750–1820 (paperback ed. 1997) [hereinafter Ferguson, The American 
Enlightenment]; Robert A. Ferguson, Reading the Early Republic (paperback ed. 2006); Henry 
F. May, The Enlightenment in America (1976); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: 
Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (2d ed. 2003); Gordon 
S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (Univ. of N.C. Press 1998) (1969).
22. On the intellectual context of the origins of the Constitution, see, for example, David J. Bederman, The 
Classical Foundations of the American Constitution: Prevailing Wisdom (2008); Bernstein, 
supra note 1, at 111–48; Bernstein, supra note 2, at 12–38; Commager, The Empire of Reason, supra 
note 21; Ferguson, The American Enlightenment, supra note 21; Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of 
American Constitutionalism (1988); May, supra note 21; Meyer Reinhold, Classica Americana: 
The Greek and Roman Heritage in the United States (1984); Carl J. Richard, The Founders 
and the Classics: Greece, Rome, and the American Enlightenment (1994).
23. Adair, supra note 21, at xiv–xv.
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 B. Technological Context
 Just as we are prisoners of our own intellectual world, we are prisoners of our 
own technological world.24 Law students often must be instructed to use books and 
libraries rather than the Internet or online databases for research. Sometimes we find 
it hard to imagine a world without cellular phones or laptop computers. By contrast, 
in the era of the making of the Constitution, information and power could travel no 
faster than a man could run, a horse could gallop, or a ship could sail—and the most 
valuable information was set forth in books.
 These facts transform our understanding not only of the world of the Founding 
Guys, but also of the constitutional arrangements they created for that world. For 
example, they had time for deliberation on such issues as war and peace. A president 
could not set a war in motion with a phone call or the push of a button, communicating 
instantaneously with a technologically advanced army, navy, and air force. As a result, 
our constitutional mechanisms for dealing with issues of war and peace are grounded 
in eighteenth-century technological assumptions that fit uncomfortably with the 
modern exigencies of nuclear war, global terrorism, sudden attacks requiring 
immediate retribution, and the like.25
 Further, when in The Federalist No. 10 Madison argued that the extended republic 
was a bulwark against the disease of faction, he based his case on his assumption that 
the United States was too big for factions to combine across state lines.26 In Madison’s 
world, factions faced the same speed limits on transportation and communication 
that governments faced. By contrast, today’s factions can easily coordinate their 
operations across state lines—by phone, by FedEx, or by e-mail—undermining the 
case for Madison’s extended republic.
 Finally, consider the question that plagued many of us after September 11, 2001, 
one that still crops up today: What would the Founding Guys have made of 9/11? 
My historian’s answer is that they would have had a collective nervous breakdown. 
For example, they could not have grasped the scale of the world of 2001, which was 
much larger than their world. In particular, when the largest cities they knew, 
London and Paris, had populations of about 900,000 and 600,000, respectively, they 
could not imagine New York City’s population today of eight million people.27 Also, 
though they might have foreseen f lying machines, they could not imagine an airliner 
24. These paragraphs apply to constitutional history and law. For a broader discussion, see James Willard 
Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers 9–11 (1950). The great legal historian 
James Willard Hurst first articulated the need to write the history of American law with attention to its 
technological context. See id.
25. See generally Ely, supra note 7, passim; see also Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security 
Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair (1990).
26. The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison).
27. See John Barrell, London and the London Corresponding Society, in Romantic Metropolis: The Urban 
Scene of British Culture, 1780–1840, at 85, 102 (James Chandler & Kevin Gilmartin eds., 2005) 
(detailing the urban climate of London from 1780–1840, and pointing out that the 1801 census reported 
a population of 900,000, with other estimates ranging from 500,000 to 1.25 million); Daniel Roche, 
The People of Paris: An Essay on Popular Culture in the 18th Century 20 (Marie Evans & 
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whose fuel tanks held more explosive power than the greatest armies or navies of 
their era could muster. Further, they could not conceive the architecture or engineering 
that makes structures like the World Trade Center possible. In his 1787 book Notes 
on the State of Virginia, for example, Thomas Jefferson described how he peered down 
from the Natural Bridge (which he owned) into the abyss about 270 feet below, 
remarking, “Looking down from this height about a minute, gave me a violent head 
ach[e].”28 How could Jefferson (one of his era’s greatest architects) comprehend the 
110-story World Trade Center, built with technology that was not available in his 
era? Nor could they imagine the horrific collision between that explosive force and 
that architectural marvel—let alone viewing a recorded version of that horrific event, 
whether as a motion picture or a videotape or a computer file played on a video 
display terminal. Finally, given their era’s limitations of communications technology 
(which meant that, even at its fastest, news could cross the Atlantic in no less than 
two months), how could they wrap their minds around the technology by which 
people around the world could witness the catastrophe of 9/11 in real time, as it 
happened—technology that made the world of 2001 a smaller world, in some ways, 
than the world of the Founding Guys?
 These examples teach us that context shapes and limits what we can learn from 
the past, rendering woefully inadequate the context-free original-intent enterprise 
practiced by most jurists, legal scholars, and politicians.
iii. thE CasE Of thE absEnt fOUndErs
 Original-intent analysis focuses on a small group of self-conscious founders, 
those present at the creation (as delegates to the Federal Convention or to the state 
ratifying conventions), who grappled with the intellectual and political issues of 
constitution-making and constitutional design. The “usual suspects” include James 
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, James Wilson, Gouverneur Morris, and Charles 
Pinckney. That focus seems to make sense, for these individuals left us the clearest 
principled analyses that modern jurists apply to constitutional questions. But are they 
the whole story?
 Two other groups of people are relevant to the Constitution’s origins but are 
often overlooked in the scavenger-hunt for original intent. First, there are intellectual 
statesmen who were not present at the creation of the Constitution, but who 
influenced it indirectly. Second, there are politicians who were neither present at the 
creation nor intellectual statesmen, but who significantly shaped the constitutional 
experiment. These are the “Absent Founders.”
Gwynne Lewis trans., 1987) (1981) (detailing the urban climate of eighteenth-century Paris and 
estimating a Parisian population of around 600,000 in 1789).
28. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, reprinted in Thomas Jefferson: Writings 
123, 148 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (1787).
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 John Adams and Thomas Jefferson exemplify the first category.29 Neither was a 
delegate to the Convention, for both were diplomats 3000 miles from the scene of 
action—Adams as American Minister to Great Britain, Jefferson as American 
Minister to France—but both men exerted a variety of indirect influences on the 
making of the Constitution. First, they sent their ideas across the Atlantic by letter 
and by publication. Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia exerted indirect influence 
on the making of the Constitution during ratification, and Jefferson’s letters helped 
to shape James Madison’s thinking on the need for a bill of rights as he entered the 
First Congress.30 So, too, the first volume of John Adams’s A Defence of the 
Constitutions of Government was republished in Philadelphia on the eve of the 
Convention; some observers, such as Adams’s friend Benjamin Rush, argued that the 
book guided the delegates’ approach to constitutional design.31 Second, the work and 
comments of both men on their respective state constitutions enriched the intellectual 
mulch from which the U.S. Constitution arose. John Adams was principal draftsman 
of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, a key model for the U.S. Constitution of 
1787;32 Thomas Jefferson’s penetrating critique of the Virginia Constitution of 1776, 
29. For works discussing John Adams, see, for example, Gilbert Chinard, Honest John Adams (Peter 
Smith 1976) (1933); John Ferling, John Adams: A Life (1992); James Grant, John Adams: Party 
of One (2005); Zoltán Haraszti, John Adams & the Prophets of Progress (1952); John R. 
Howe, Jr., The Changing Political Thought of John Adams (1966); Peter Shaw, The 
Character of John Adams (1976); C. Bradley Thompson, John Adams & the Spirit of Liberty 
(1998). See also R.B. Bernstein, “Let Us Dare to Read, Think, Speak, and Write”: John Adams’s Use of Reading 
as Political and Constitutional Armory, in The Libraries, Leadership, and Legacy of John Adams 
and Thomas Jefferson 81 (Robert C. Baron & Conrad Edick Wright eds., 2010).
  For works discussing Thomas Jefferson, see, for example, R.B. Bernstein, Thomas Jefferson 
(2003); Jeffersonian Legacies (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993); 1 Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His 
Time: Jefferson the Virginian (1948); 2 Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time: Jefferson 
and the Rights of Man (1951); 3 Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time: Jefferson and the 
Ordeal of Liberty (1962); 4 Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time: Jefferson the President: 
First Term 1801–1805 (1970); 5 Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time: Jefferson the 
President: First Term 1805–1809 (1974); 6 Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time: The Sage 
of Monticello (1981); Peter S. Onuf, Jeffersonian Legacies (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993); Peter S. 
Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire: The Language of American Nationhood (2000) [hereinafter Onuf, 
Jefferson’s Empire]; Peter S. Onuf, The Mind of Thomas Jefferson (2007); Merrill D. 
Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A Biography (1970).
  For the correspondence between Jefferson and Adams during and immediately after the 
Convention, see 1 The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence Between 
Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams 163–238 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959); Merrill 
D. Peterson, Adams and Jefferson: A Revolutionary Dialogue (1976).
30. See generally 1 The Republic of Letters: The Correspondence of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison, 1776–1826, at 516–637 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995) (providing a collection of the 
correspondence between Jefferson and Madison regarding the framing and adoption of the U.S. 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights). For discussions of the friendship and intellectual and political 
partnership between Jefferson and Madison, see Lance Banning, Jefferson and Madison: Three 
Conversations from the Founding (1995); Andrew Burstein & Nancy Isenberg, Madison and 
Jefferson (2010); Adrienne Koch, Jefferson and Madison: The Great Collaboration (1950).
31. See Thompson, supra note 29, at 251–55.
32. See id. at xiii, 276–77; see also Howe, supra note 29, at 67, 83, 85, 88, 90, 94–96; 8 The Adams Papers: 
Papers of John Adams 228–71 (Richard Alan Ryerson et al. eds., 1989) (containing documents, 
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recounted in Notes on the State of Virginia, as well as his eloquent and powerful 
meditations on constitutional problems and solutions in his private letters, helped to 
shape the thinking of Madison and other framers.33 Third, both men’s ordeals as 
American diplomats helped convince them that the United States needed a stronger 
government to protect its interests in the world, and both men wrote home making 
powerful arguments to that effect.34 In sum, both men qualify as Absent Founders.
 Aaron Burr exemplifies the second category.35 Burr played no role in the 
movement to call the Federal Convention, or in the Convention, or in the struggle 
for ratification. He did not serve in the New York ratifying convention, refusing even 
to be a candidate, and he wrote nothing, public or private, in the “paper war” over the 
Constitution. Burr’s silence on the issues of the day was so conspicuous that his 
contemporaries, especially Alexander Hamilton, suspected that Burr lacked any 
views on his era’s great political questions; he seemed interested only in the political 
fortunes of Aaron Burr.36 Nonetheless, in four ways (and maybe five), Burr shaped 
the evolution of the constitutional system.37
 First, in 1796 and 1800, Burr devised a partisan alliance foreshadowing the 
modern political party. His role in creating the first Republican Party was pivotal in 
the election of 1800, reconfiguring American views of presidential politics and of the 
legitimacy of party politics in the constitutional system.38
 Second, the electoral deadlock of 1800–1801, in which Burr played a central 
part, showed that the Constitution required repair. The constitutional monument of 
the electoral crisis of 1800 is the Twelfth Amendment, which retooled the Electoral 
College by separating voting for President and Vice President and by revising the 
including the Massachusetts Constitution, with annotation and commentary); Robert J. Taylor, 
Construction of the Massachusetts Constitution, 90 Proc. of the Am. Antiquarian Soc’y 317 (1981).
33. See Jefferson, supra note 28, at 121–25 (containing Jefferson’s critique of the 1776 Virginia Constitution); 
see also David N. Mayer, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson 55–88 (1994). 
Madison cited Jefferson and quoted at length from Notes on the State of Virginia in The Federalist No. 
48 (James Madison).
34. See generally Thompson, supra note 29, at 40–41, 79–87 (discussing Adams’s advocacy of constitutional 
reform); Haraszti, supra note 29; Howe, supra note 29, at 67; Wood, supra note 21, at 567–92; see also 
Mayer, supra note 33, at 91–99 (discussing Jefferson’s somewhat more ambivalent and conf licted 
advocacy of constitutional reform).
35. For works discussing Burr, see generally Nancy Isenberg, Fallen Founder: The Life of Aaron 
Burr (2007); Milton Lomask, Aaron Burr: The Years from Princeton to Vice President 
1756–1805 (1979); Milton Lomask, Aaron Burr: The Conspiracy and Years of Exile 1805–
1836 (1982); 1 James Parton, The Life and Times of Aaron Burr (Houghton, Miff lin & Co. 1893) 
(1857); 2 James Parton, The Life and Times of Aaron Burr (Ellen Willis Eldridge Parton 1892) 
(1857); 1–2 Political Papers and Correspondence of Aaron Burr (Mary-Jo Kline & Joanne 
Wood Ryan eds., 1983). For a summary treatment, see Richard B. Bernstein, Aaron Burr, in New York 
and the Union 575 (Stephen L. Schechter & Richard B. Bernstein eds., 1990). 
36. See Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic 206–07 
(2001).
37. The following paragraphs draw on my analysis in Bernstein, supra note 35, passim.
38. See Freeman, supra note 36, at 199–261.
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system that would decide contested elections should the Electoral College fail to 
generate a clear winner.39
 Third, in 1804–1805, Vice President Burr presided over the Senate’s impeachment 
trial of Justice Samuel Chase. Having studied such British impeachment precedents 
as the impeachment of Warren Hastings, Burr conducted the Senate’s trial as a fair, 
impartial judicial proceeding—a precedent that has shaped all later American 
impeachment trials.40
 Fourth, in 1807, as the most prominent American ever tried for treason, Burr, as 
both defendant and one of his own defense lawyers, helped to vindicate the 
Constitution’s narrow, precise definition of the crime of treason and helped to create 
a key precedent for judicial review of claims of executive privilege.41
 Fifth (though this is a matter of speculation), by killing Alexander Hamilton, 
Burr deprived us of a generation of lawyers whom Hamilton would have trained and 
would have absorbed Hamilton’s brand of energetic nationalist constitutionalism. 
We can only speculate about the difference that these lawyers would have made in 
the development of the U.S. Constitution in the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s.42
 In sum, though not a conventional founder, Aaron Burr is a pivotal figure in the 
Constitution’s development. He drops out of the record, however, if we cling to the 
blinkered originalist approach to the Constitution’s origins, focusing only on the 
self-conscious intellectual statesmen who were framers or ratifiers.
iV. thE CasE Of thE fast-Changing COnstitUtiOns
 James Madison was born in Virginia in 1751, a subject of King George II, living 
under the unwritten British Constitution and Virginia’s colonial charter. In 1776, the 
colonial system gave way to the Second Continental Congress and the Virginia 
convention, which wrote the state’s 1776 Constitution. In 1781, the adoption of the 
Articles of Confederation gave the United States a new form of government. In 
39. Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 12 J.L. & Pol. 665, 
675–77 (1996). For works discussing the Twelfth Amendment and the Electoral College, see generally 
Richard B. Bernstein with Jerome Agel, Amending America: If We Love the Constitution 
So Much, Why Do We Keep Trying to Change It? 59–65 (1993); Tadahisa Kuroda, The 
Origins of the Twelfth Amendment: The Electoral College in the Early Republic, 1787–
1804 (1994).
40. See Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 
61 Fordham L. Rev. 497, 500 & n.8 (1992). For a discussion of Burr’s role as presiding officer in the 
Senate’s impeachment trial of Justice Samuel Chase, see Isenberg, supra note 35, at 272–79.
41. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. 1807) (No. 14,694) (review of presidential claim of 
executive privilege in response to subpoena duces tecum); 1 Parton, supra note 35, at 460 (discussing 
Burr’s role as the leader of the defense team). For discussions of Burr’s travails that culminated in his 
1807 trial for treason, see Isenberg, supra note 35, at 271–366; Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Aaron 
Burr: Conspiracy to Treason passim (2002).
42. For discussions of the legal education in the era of Alexander Hamilton, see generally The Gladsome 
Light of Jurisprudence: Learning the Law in England and the United States in the 18th 
and 19th Centuries (Michael H. Hoeflich ed., 1988); 1 The History of Legal Education in the 
United States: Commentaries and Primary Sources (Steve Sheppard ed., 1999).
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1788–1789, the U.S. Constitution replaced the Articles of Confederation. Finally, in 
1830, the aged Madison was a leading delegate to the Virginia constitutional 
convention that replaced the state’s 1776 Constitution. In his lifetime, Madison saw 
three Virginia governments and four American governments.43
 Madison was not alone. Every American in the Revolutionary and Founding 
Periods lived under the unwritten British Constitution and three different forms of 
American government in the span of twenty years, and under at least two, and in 
some cases three or four, colonial and state governments during that time.44 Americans 
did not see this rapidity of constitutional change as unusual, though Madison found 
it troubling, for he wanted a constitutional system to last long enough for people to 
become loyal to it.45 Even so, neither Madison nor his colleagues foresaw that the 
Constitution they framed in 1787 would last so long; in his final years in the mid-
1830s, Madison struggled to reconcile the differences between “the conflicting values 
and demands” of “an enlightened world in which reason was enjoined to discipline 
the unsettling effects of passion” (the culture in which he helped to frame and adopt 
the Constitution in 1787–1788) and “a . . . world of romantic democracy in which 
passionate individualism threatened to overwhelm all restraints of custom, tradition, 
and history.”46 His struggle epitomized the problems of seeking to guide in a turbulent 
present a constitution framed in a very different past. It is no wonder that he quipped 
in 1831, with wry sadness, “Having outlived so many of my contemporaries, I ought 
not to forget that I may be thought to have outlived myself.”47 The rapidity of 
constitutional change in the era of the Constitution’s origins raises difficult questions 
for those who would apply originalist methods to problems arising in the Constitution’s 
third century because they wrongly assume that the framers and ratifiers of the 
Constitution created and adopted that document in full confidence that it would 
continue as the nation’s fundamental law for centuries to come.
 One further point deserves mention, as it links the issue of rapid constitutional 
change with that of intellectual context. The Founding Guys saw as the greatest 
challenge facing them the idea, long a part of the conventional wisdom of Atlantic 
civilization, that a republic was mortal—that for a variety of reasons, most having to 
do with diseases (such as factionalism) that plagued republics throughout history, 
republican governments tended to collapse, succeeded either by tyranny or by a period 
of anarchy followed by tyranny. The historian of political thought J.G.A. Pocock 
memorably labeled the moment when a republic confronted its own mortality as “the 
43. See Drew R. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy 
passim (1989).
44. For the record of American constitutional experiments at state and national levels, see generally 1–7 
The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of 
the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of 
America passim (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909).
45. See The Federalist No. 49 (James Madison).
46. McCoy, supra note 43, at xv.
47. 9 The Writings of James Madison: 1819–1836, at 460 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
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Machiavellian moment.”48 Recognition of this truth by a wide variety of leading 
figures among the Founding Guys suggests that they recognized that even the best 
constitution would not last long without periodic revision and recourse to first 
principles. To cite one example, in his now-famous closing speech to the Federal 
Convention on September 17, 1787, Benjamin Franklin addressed the mortality of 
republics and their susceptibility to failure:
In these sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they 
are such; because I think a general Government necessary for us, and there is 
no form of Government but what may be a blessing to the people if well 
administered, and believe farther that this is likely to be well administered for 
a course of years, and can only end in Despotism, as other forms have done 
before it, when the people shall become so corrupted as to need despotic 
Government, being incapable of any other.49
Given this shared view of the fragility of republican government and constitutions, it 
is highly unlikely that any of the framers or ratif iers of the proposed Constitution 
thought that the document would still be in effect as the fundamental law of the 
United States more than two hundred years after its framing and adoption, 
challenging a core presumption of originalism.
V. thE CasE Of thE EXpLOding COnstitUtiOnaL Cigar
 The practical joke of the exploding cigar used to be familiar to everyone from the 
popularity of old Warner Brothers cartoons—but that image has a serious connotation 
when applied to the Constitution’s origins. In the Constitution’s first decade, the 
process of putting it into effect and the way it worked once it was put into effect 
repeatedly raised problems that the framers and ratifiers did not anticipate; problems 
that cast a new and disturbing light on some of their most cherished ideas and 
expectations; problems that revealed a range of not-easily-reconciled understandings 
of how the document should work; problems that caused their expectations, 
understandings, and intentions about the Constitution to blow up in their faces like 
an exploding cigar. Consider the following examples.
 In the spring of 1789, as the House of Representatives worked on bills creating 
the new general government’s executive departments, they confronted the issue of 
who has the power to remove executive officials—a question that the Federal 
Convention never addressed.50 In the complex and thorny debate that ensued, as 
many as seven distinct positions emerged:
48. See Pocock, supra note 21, passim.
49. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra note 13, at 641–43 (providing Benjamin 
Franklin’s September 17, 1787, speech as transcribed in James Madison’s Notes of Debates in the Federal 
Convention of 1787).
50. For discussions of the removal-power debate of 1789, see James Hart, The American Presidency in 
Action 1789, at 155–214 (1948); Rakove, supra note 1, at 347–50; Charles C. Thach, Jr., The 
Creation of the Presidency, 1775–1789, at 140–65 (Liberty Fund Inc. 2010) (1922); Leonard D. 
White, The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History 20–25 (Macmillan Co. 1967) 
(1948). The House of Representatives debates of May 19, 1789, and June 13–22, 1789, are easily found 
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 First, the only way to remove an executive official is by impeachment.51 Second, 
the President may remove the official because the Constitution does not bar him 
from doing so and does not give the Senate a role in removals.52 Third, the President 
has the power to remove an executive official because removal is an “inherently 
executive” power.53 Fourth, the President has the power to remove executive officials 
because the Constitution makes him responsible for their conduct.54 Fifth, if the 
official is to be named by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, he 
must be removed with the advice and consent of the Senate.55 Sixth, Congress has 
the power to grant the President the removal power as part of its power over federal 
offices and officials’ terms.56 Seventh, Congress has freedom to act on removals 
rooted in the “necessary and proper” clause of the Constitution.57
 After extensive debate, Congress chose the third position (a position endorsed by 
Representative James Madison), but the issue arose again in 186858 and then in the 
1920s59 and the 1930s;60 in fact, in 1868 that issue was at the core of the impeachment 
of President Andrew Johnson.61
 In the summer of 1789, the Senate had to define the phrase “the advice and 
consent of the Senate” in the context of making treaties. President George Washington 
came to the Senate to present in person his proposed terms for a treaty with the 
Creek Indians, seeking the Senators’ “advice and consent.” 62 The Senators were 
dismayed by what Pennsylvania Senator William Maclay called the President’s 
attempt to “over awe the timid and neutral part of the Senate.”63 Maclay asked 
Washington to leave the draft terms for the Senate to discuss, so that they could send 
him their answer, and the rest of the Senate followed his lead. As Maclay wrote in 
his diary, Washington “started up in a Violent fret,” and, growling, “This defeats 
in the superb modern edition, 10–11 The Documentary History of the First Federal Congress 
726–40, 842–1036 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992). See also infra note 51.
51. Gerhard Casper, Separating Power: Essays on the Founding Period 35 (1997).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 35–36.
54. Id. at 36.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Michael Les Benedict, The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson 160–66 (1973).
59. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
60. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
61. See Benedict, supra note 58, at 160–66. 
62. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; William Maclay, The Diary of William Maclay and Other 
Notes on Senate Debates (1789–1791), reprinted in 9 The Documentary History of the First 
Federal Congress, supra note 50, at 128–30.
63. See Maclay, supra note 62, at 130.
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every purpose of my coming here,” stalked out of the Senate Chamber.64 President 
Washington, who sat through the entire Convention, had his view of what “advice 
and consent” meant, but the Senators, eleven of whom also had been delegates in 
Philadelphia in 1787, had a different understanding in mind.65
 In the fall of 1789, Congress created the Treasury Department. They required 
the Secretary of the Treasury to prepare reports on the public credit at the command 
of Congress, thinking that this duty would keep the secretary under the congressional 
thumb. Instead, Alexander Hamilton used his reports on the public credit to set the 
agenda of American politics, in the process shifting the initiative of policy-making 
from Congress to the executive branch—which is not what most of the Constitution’s 
framers and ratifiers expected.66
 My favorite example is the Electoral College.67 The Constitution’s framers 
expected the Electoral College only to thin the herd of presidential candidates, with 
the House of Representatives picking the President and Vice President from the top 
three.68 George Mason of Virginia predicted that this would happen in nineteen out 
of twenty elections.69 It did not work out that way.
 In 1789, the Electoral College made George Washington its unanimous first 
choice for President, giving John Adams as Vice President a plurality of thirty-four 
out of sixty-nine electoral votes. In 1792, the Electoral College again made 
Washington its unanimous first choice, with Adams receiving seventy-seven votes, 
doing better than he had in 1789. In 1796, the first contested presidential election, 
Adams narrowly but decisively beat Thomas Jefferson, seventy-one to sixty-eight. By 
64. Id.
65. For our only first-hand account, see Maclay, supra note 62. For biographical information on Maclay, 
see generally Freeman, supra note 36, at 11–61. The eleven Senators who served in the Federal 
Convention were: Oliver Ellsworth and William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut, Richard Bassett and 
George Read of Delaware, William Few of Georgia, Caleb Strong of Massachusetts, John Langdon of 
New Hampshire, William Paterson of New Jersey, Rufus King of New York, Robert Morris of 
Pennsylvania, and Pierce Butler of South Carolina. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 724 n.3 (1986); 
Michael Bhargava, The First Congress Canon and the Supreme Court’s Use of History, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 
1745, 1766–69 (2006).
66. See generally Clinton Rossiter, Alexander Hamilton and the Constitution (1964). These 
three reports are conveniently found in Alexander Hamilton: Writings 531–74, 575–612, 647–734 
(Joanne B. Freeman ed., 2001).
67. For a discussion of the the origins and early workings of the Electoral College, see Kuroda, supra note 
39, at 7–15. For the leading critique, see George C. Edwards III, Why the Electoral College Is 
Bad for America (2004). For the leading defense, see Judith Best, The Case Against Direct 
Election of the President: A Defense of the Electoral College (1975) and Judith A. Best, 
The Choice of the People? Debating the Electoral College (1996).
68. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; William Josephson & Beverly J. Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, 
22 J. Legis. 145, 151–56 (1996).
69. Edwards, supra note 67, at 86 (quoting 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, supra 
note 13, at 500).
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1800, the Electoral College had picked the President and Vice President three times 
out of three, with no need to turn to Congress.70
 In 1800, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr tied in the Electoral College with 
seventy-three votes apiece, a result requiring the House to pick the President,71 a step 
that George Mason had predicted in 1787 would happen nineteen times out of 
twenty. By 1800, however, Americans had grown so used to the Electoral College 
picking the President and Vice President that the deadlock between Jefferson and 
Burr provoked a crisis. Backers of Jefferson insisted not merely that Burr defer to 
their hero, but that he declare himself unworthy of the Presidency by comparison 
with Jefferson. This demand nettled Burr, who knew that the premise of the Electoral 
College was that the electors vote for two men, each qualified to be President; Burr 
also deemed himself, as a Revolutionary War hero and an experienced and able 
politician, to be at least as fit for the Presidency as Jefferson was. Federalist members 
of the lame-duck House, seeking a way to stymie Jefferson, hoped to strike a deal 
with Burr, who was at least willing to listen to any reasonable offer from people who 
were treating him with respect. Hearing rumors that the House might thwart the 
people’s will (though there were no popular-vote totals to document this view) by 
choosing Burr (the Republicans’ choice for Vice President) instead of Jefferson (the 
Republicans’ choice for President), Governor James Monroe of Virginia and Governor 
Thomas McKean of Pennsylvania each threatened to march his state’s militia to 
Washington unless the House elected Jefferson—which it did, finally, on the thirty-
sixth ballot.72 This traumatic crisis produced the Twelfth Amendment, which 
separated the choice of President from that of Vice President and thus avoided a 
repeat of the deadlock of 1800.
 Another “exploding cigar” arose not during the Founding Period but in modern 
times. The Constitution assigns the Chief Justice of the United States the duty of 
presiding over the impeachment trial of a President. The Constitution assigns the 
Vice President the duty of presiding over impeachment trials of federal judges or 
other executive-branch officials—a clear deduction from the Vice President’s duties 
70. See Historical Election Results, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/electoral-college/votes/index.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2011).
71. There is a vast and still-growing literature on the presidential election of 1800; the most useful 
treatments of the subject are Susan Dunn, Jefferson’s Second Revolution: The Election Crisis 
of 1800 and the Triumph of Republicanism (2004); John Ferling, Adams vs. Jefferson: The 
Tumultuous Election of 1800 (2004); Freeman, supra note 36, at 199–261; Edward J. Larson, A 
Magnificent Catastrophe: The Tumultuous Election of 1800, America’s First Presidential 
Campaign (2007); Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire, supra note 29, at 80–108; The Revolution of 1800: 
Democracy, Race, & the New Republic (James Horn, Jan Ellen Lewis & Peter S. Onuf eds., 2002); 
Bernard A. Weisberger, America Afire: Jefferson, Adams, and the Revolutionary Election 
of 1800 (2000). Older works include Frank van der Linden, The Turning Point: Jefferson’s 
Battle for the Presidency (Fulcrum Publ’g 2000) (1962); Daniel Sisson, The American 
Revolution of 1800 (1974). The latest addition to the literature as of the writing of this article is 
James Roger Sharp, The Deadlocked Election of 1800: Jefferson, Burr, and the Union in 
the Balance (2010).
72. See The Revolution of 1800: Democracy, Race, & the New Republic, supra note 71, at 75, 87–88; 
see also works cited supra note 71.
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as defined by the Constitution.73 But who presides over the impeachment trial of a 
Vice President of the United States? The answer is—the Vice President of the United 
States. The Constitution’s framers may have intended to have the Chief Justice 
preside over impeachment trials for Presidents and Vice Presidents, once they finished 
their last-minute addition of the Vice Presidency to the Constitution, but they never 
made the needed change.74
 In the summer of 1973, then-Vice President Spiro T. Agnew was indicted for 
bribery and corruption for his actions beginning when he was county executive of 
Baltimore County and continuing through his service as governor of Maryland and 
Vice President. Agnew desperately sought to have the House impeach him as a way 
to forestall his prosecution, but the House leadership, prodded by then-House 
Majority Leader Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill, refused to go ahead with an impeachment. 
(The leadership realized that an Agnew inquiry would interfere with the ongoing 
inquiry into impeaching President Richard Nixon, which would mean not only that 
the Nixon inquiry would indefinitely delay Agnew’s impeachment, but also that, 
were Nixon to be impeached, Agnew would become President.)75 Facing not just 
indictment but almost certain conviction after the House turned down his bid to be 
impeached instead of indicted, Agnew pleaded no contest to the indictment and 
resigned his office, making way for Nixon to nominate, and both Houses to confirm, 
a new Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Gerald R. Ford, the 
former House Minority Leader, eventually succeeded Nixon as President when 
Nixon resigned in 1974.76 There is no evidence that Agnew realized that he might be 
able to preside over his own impeachment trial, and it is blessedly unclear what he 
might have done with that presiding role had he taken the chance to exercise it.
 In 2006–2008, demands arose that then-Vice President Dick Cheney be 
impeached.77 Given Cheney’s novel and interesting views of constitutional questions, 
it is even more unclear what Cheney might have done had he been impeached and 
then learned he had a chance to preside over his own Senate impeachment trial.78 
Heaven grant, given the growing importance of the Vice Presidency,79 that we never 
face another such problem.
73. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (general duty of Vice President to preside); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (Chief Justice 
presiding over impeachment trials in Senate).
74. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, in Constitutional Stupidities, 
Constitutional Tragedies 75–76 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
75. See generally Jimmy Breslin, How the Good Guys Finally Won: Notes from an Impeachment 
Summer (1975) (examining the political dealings surrounding the Watergate scandal).
76. See John D. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Complete History and Earliest 
Applications 117–62 (1992) (1976).
77. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Impeach Cheney: The Vice President Has Run Utterly Amok and Must Be Stopped, 
Slate (June 27, 2007, 5:06 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2169292/.
78. See generally Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency (expanded paperback ed. 
2009).
79. See Joel K. Goldstein, The Rising Power of the Modern Vice Presidency, 38 Presidential Stud. Q. 374, 
374–89 (2008); The Role of the Modern Vice President, Centerpoint (Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for 
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Vi. sOME tEntatiVE COnCLUsiOns
 Each of these case studies represents a failure of insight, a failure of foresight, or 
an instance in which those who made the Constitution fell prey to the “law of 
unintended consequences.”80 These examples are difficult to square with the self-
conscious, virtually omniscient founders at the core of originalist analysis.
 Where do these “historian’s heresies” leave originalist jurisprudence? First, they 
teach that theorists who make history central to their theoretical enterprise run the 
risk that historians will find their work wanting as history. Some theorists respond 
dismissively, “That doesn’t matter, because I’m not doing history.” These theorists 
fail to grasp that, when they invoke history, their theory is only as sound as the 
history on which they build. Building on bad history is like building on sand.
 Using history this way is nothing new in Anglo-American constitutional thought. 
John Phillip Reid of New York University Law School has identified a form of 
argument, “forensic history,” that was central to constitutional controversies in 
England and America throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In 
forensic history, the disputants may cite historical examples, invoke historical 
precedents, and draw conclusions about the “lessons” that history may teach, but they 
are not doing history at all—rather, they are making legal arguments.81
 Given forensic history’s long and honorable pedigree, why do historians object 
when lawyers and judges engage in the modern American version—originalist 
jurisprudence? The reason is simple, and yet not apparent on the surface. The 
historical and legal professions have diverged since the time that Reid studied in his 
work on forensic history. Today, a distinct historical profession exists, with its own 
approaches to identifying, testing, and using historical evidence, and to making and 
substantiating historical arguments.82 What historians do is profoundly different 
Scholars, D.C.), June 2007, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.item&news_
id=239308.
80. This term was coined by the eminent historian of science and sociologist Robert K. Merton. See Robert 
K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 Am. Soc. Rev. 894, 897 (1936). 
For a discussion of this phrase’s origins, see the discussion in Bernstein, supra note 2, at 209 n.96.
81. See generally John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 193, 193–223 (1993).
Historical adjudication is too convenient to be banished from decision writing. We 
should acknowledge that lawyers and judges can use history in a variety of ways and 
that not every exercise of historical jurisprudence deserves to be dismissed as law office 
history.
 According to the academic canons of the historical method, there is no need to 
consider instances of the proper use of history either to prove a fact or to establish a 
point of law—if such instances can be found. Instead, attention should be given to a 
species of history that does not meet the canons of historians’ history, but for centuries 
has made legitimate contributions to Anglo-American law, especially to Anglo-
American constitutional law. It is forensic history.
 Id. at 205.
82. See, e.g., John Burrow, A History of Histories: Epics, Chronicles, and Inquiries from 
Herodotus and Thucydides to the Twentieth Century (2008); John Higham, History: 
Professional Scholarship in America (John Hopkins Univ. Press updated paperback ed. 1989) 
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from what lawyers do—not least because historians are willing to run the risk that 
their work will explode their initial assumptions about what they will find, whereas 
lawyers nearly always find what they expect to find and prove what they expect to 
prove. As Reid himself has noted, forensic history “does not meet the canons of 
historians’ history.”83 When lawyers or jurists or legal scholars proclaim, “History 
teaches this,” or “History commands that,” they inevitably blur or erase the line in 
the public mind dividing historians’ history from forensic history, producing a 
dangerous confusion about what history can and cannot do—whether or not they 
specifically intend that result.
 This is the lesson taught by Gordon S. Wood of Brown University, whose first 
book, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, is a modern classic that many 
constitutional theorists read without quite understanding it.84 In 1987, Wood took 
part in a symposium on his book in the William and Mary Quarterly as part of that 
journal’s commemoration of the Constitution’s bicentennial.85 Here is an excerpt 
from Wood’s wise reflections on this question:
When confronted with these contrasting meanings of the Constitution, 
historians, it seems to me, are not supposed to decide which was more 
“correct” or more “true.” Our task is rather to explain the reasons for these 
contrasting meanings and why each side should have given to the Constitution 
the meaning it did. There was not in 1787–1788—and today there is still 
not—one “correct” or “true” meaning of the Constitution. The Constitution 
means whatever we want it to mean. Of course, we cannot attribute any 
meaning we want and expect to get away with it. We have to convince others 
of our “true” interpretation, and if we can convince enough people that that is 
the “true” interpretation, then so it becomes. That is how the culture changes. 
It may be a necessary fiction for lawyers and jurists to believe in a “correct” or 
“true” meaning of the Constitution in order to carry on their business, but we 
historians have different obligations and aims.86
 Military history also faces this problem, as the eminent military historian Sir 
Michael Howard has pointed out. In his 1981 inaugural lecture as Regius Professor 
of History at Oxford University,87 Howard recalled that, as a young scholar, he gave 
a talk to a group of staff officers on a historical episode, only to have one brilliant 
officer demand irritably, “But what were its Lessons?”88 That question illuminates the 
challenge of being a military historian, who (like a constitutional historian) studies 
(1965); Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American 
Historical Profession (1988).
83. Reid, supra note 81, at 205.
84. See Wood, supra note 21.
85. Gordon S. Wood, Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America, 44 Wm. & Mary Q. 628 (1987).
86. Id. at 632–33. 
87. Michael Howard, The Lessons of History, 15 The History Teacher 489 (1982), reprinted in Michael 
Howard, The Lessons of History 10 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id. at 10.
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the past as a series of unique events and experiences not capable of being repeated, 
taking place in a world fundamentally different from our own. Like lawyers and 
judges, military officers seek from history a set of easily understood and easily applied 
lessons. Howard’s advice should guide those wrestling with history as they interpret 
the Constitution:
[T]he first lesson that historians are entitled to teach is the austere one: not to 
generalize from false premises based on inadequate evidence. The second is 
no more comforting: the past is a foreign country; there is very little we can 
say about it until we have learned its language and understood its assumptions; 
and in deriving conclusions about the processes which occurred in it and 
applying them to our own day we must be very careful indeed.89
I should add that recently I had the good fortune to get in touch with Sir Michael 
Howard via e-mail, and I described the parallels between military historians and 
constitutional historians. He wrote in reply:
We both have to interpret what was meant by people in the past who may 
have used the same words as we do, but whose culture and mind-set, although 
superficially similar to our own, was in fact rather alien, and who were 
propounding solutions to problems quite different from those which we have 
to face. But as I understand it, your position is even more complex than mine, 
in that you have to deal with a school of thought that maintains that, having 
discovered what the Founding Fathers actually meant by what they wrote, we 
have to apply that intention unaltered to our contemporary conditions 
irrespective of changing circumstances. I don’t think one could find today any 
general who insisted on applying Napoleonic tactics on a battlefield dominated 
by enemy air-power!90
 That we ought to be careful in using the past does not mean that we cannot use 
it at all, or that we cannot derive useful lessons from it. This is the position of 
Professor Jack N. Rakove of Stanford University, winner of the Pulitzer Prize in 
History for his 1996 book Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the 
Constitution. Though Rakove has long fought the excesses and absurdities of 
originalism, he does not reject the enterprise altogether. By contrast to strong 
originalists such as the late Raoul Berger, the late Justice Hugo L. Black, and the 
still-living Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, Rakove’s work has inspired 
an interpretative position that other scholars call “weak originalism.”91 On this view, 
we should give evidence of the Constitution’s origins persuasive but not dispositive 
value, for two reasons. First, after looking at the constitutional text that we seek to 
interpret, we ought next to address that text’s origins (including both the document’s 
89. Id. at 13; see also 1 James Bryce, The American Commonwealth 8 (1888) (“[T]he chief practical use 
of history is to deliver us from plausible historical analogies . . . .”).
90. E-mail from Sir Michael Howard, Regius Professor Emeritus, Oxford Univ., to author (Apr. 7, 2010, 
05:49 AM) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
91. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1627, 1627–28 (1997).
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framing and its ratification).92 Second, because the framers were among the most 
learned, intelligent, shrewd, and perceptive minds in American history, we should 
learn from their wisdom.93
 Weak originalism implies another important point: though we may start with 
the framers and ratifiers, we should not stop with them; in fact, they themselves 
would counsel us not to stop there. In the spring of 1790, in his first grand-jury 
charge, Chief Justice John Jay addressed the momentous events in constitution-
making in which he had taken part:
The Institution of General and State Governments, their respective 
Conveniences and Defects in Practice, and the subsequent Alterations made in 
some of them, have operated as useful Experiments, and conspired to promote 
our Advancement in this interesting Science. It is pleasing to observe that the 
present national Government already affords advantages, which the preceding 
one proved too feeble and ill constructed to produce. How far it may be still 
distant from the Degree of Perfection to which it may possibly be carried Time 
only can decide. It is a Consolation to reflect that the good Sense of the People 
will be enabled by Experience to discover and correct its Imperfections; 
especially while they continue to retain a proper Confidence in themselves, and 
avoid those Jealousies and Dissentions which prevent Improvements often 
springing from the worst Designs frequently frustrate the best Measures.94
So, too, Jefferson advised a correspondent in 1816 about the proper way to think 
about the Virginia Constitution of 1776:
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem 
them like the arc of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to 
the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what 
they did to be beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and 
labored with it. It deserved well of its country. It was very like the present, but 
without the experience of the present; and forty years of experience in 
government is worth a century of book-reading; and this they would say 
themselves, were they to rise from the dead. I am certainly not an advocate 
for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions. I think moderate 
imperfections had better be borne with; because, when once known, we 
accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical means of correcting their 
ill effects. But I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand 
with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more 
enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners 
and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must 
advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man 
92. See Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or To It), 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1587 (1997).
93. See id.
94. John Jay’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New York (Apr. 12, 1790), 
in 2 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789–1800, at 
25, 26 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1989).
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to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to 
remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.95
 In sum, we have seen that, in many cases, attempts to seek guidance from the 
history of the making of the Constitution are unavailing—whether because we rip 
out of context ideas of the Constitution’s framers or ratifiers, or because we apply 
their ideas to issues and problems that they could not have foreseen, forgetting that—
like us—they could not predict the future.
 When we contemplate that record, we should recall what the constitutional 
theorist and historian Alexander Bickel of Yale Law School wrote in his book The 
Least Dangerous Branch: “No answer is what the wrong question begets.”96 To Bickel’s 
sage counsel I add the advice of the great fictional private investigator Sam Spade 
from John Huston’s film of The Maltese Falcon: “Let’s do something right for a 
change.”97
95. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in Thomas Jefferson: Writings, 
supra note 28, at 1395, 1401.
96. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of 
Politics 103 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962).
97. The Maltese Falcon at 01:02:35 (Warner Bros. 1941).
